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ACCOMMODATING NONEMPLOYEES:
NLRA PROTECTION OF CONCERTED UNION
CONDUCT IN THE WAKE OF SEARS
In creating the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Congress in-
tended to establish a uniform policy of labor-management relations.' Al-
though the Board's authorizing statute, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),2 does not expressly prohibit state courts from asserting jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes,3 the United States Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that concurrent state and Board authority would result in conflicting
standards of substantive law and differing remedial schemes.4 In order to
minimize the potential for conflict, the Court developed a preemption doc-
trine empowering the Board to exercise authority over a broad range of
labor and management activities.5 The scope of the Board's preemptive
1. See Findings and Declaration of Policy, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). In 1935, the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act
was passed, empowering the newly created National Labor Relations Board to conduct elec-
tions for employee representation and to remedy unfair labor practices. In an effort to strike
a balance more favorable to management interests, Congress passed the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act in 1947. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-167, 171-190 (1976)). The most recent major piece of labor relations legislation, the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, imposes a greater de-
gree of regulation on union activity and modifies Taft-Hartley prohibitions on secondary
boycotts and recognitional and organizational picketing. 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)). See also notes 12-16 and accompanying text infra.
3. In fact, § 14(c) expressly grants state courts jurisdiction in cases in which the effect
of the labor dispute in commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant Board exercise of
jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976). See note 43 infra.
4. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945); Allen-Bradley
Local, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942). See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1337-
39 (1972).
5. The preemption doctrine is grounded on the principle of federal supremacy implicit
in the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Constitution and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law
of the land .. " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824) held that "[tihe concurrent power of the states. . . is subordinate to the legislation of
Congress," id at 24 (emphasis in original), the Supreme Court has weighed congressional
grants of substantive rights heavily in determining whether state action is preempted. See,
e.g., Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301,
305-14 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
771-72 (1947).
Catholic University Law Review
authority was set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon in
which the Court held that the Board's primary jurisdiction extends to con-
duct arguably subject to the Act's protections or prohibitions.6
The Garmon decision removed location as a ground for a successful
challenge by an employer to arguably trespassory union conduct. The Act
itself provides the employer with no express authority to exclude a union
from its premises. Alternatively, the employer may seek to restrict union
entry under local trespass statutes. Under Garmon, however, states will
refuse to assert jurisdiction over such disputes because the conduct chal-
lenged by the employer is either arguably protected or arguably prohibited
under the Act. Before the state court, the conduct of the union obtains
derivative protection by the section 7 rights granted employees by the Act 7
and, in some cases, may be prohibited by sections of the Act unrelated to
location.8 In effect, the Garmon doctrine has foreclosed any forum for the
employer to challenge directly the location of union conduct.9
Addressing this dilemma, the Court provided the employer with a state
trespass remedy in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters.'° Considering the applicability of state trespass
laws to peaceful picketing by nonemployees on private property, the Court
held that a trespass action in a California court was not preempted by the
Act. In so ruling, the Court redefined the scope of the Garmon doctrine
and retarded the development of protections afforded nonemployees and
off-duty employees" under the Act. This Note will examine the Sears
6. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959). See notes 29-33 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 14, 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
8. Section 8(b) of the Act enumerates types of union conduct that justify the filing of
an unfair labor practice charge against a union by an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
An employer brings an action before the Board by the timely filing of such a charge.
9. An employer may raise the location issue before the Board indirectly, however, by
inducing the union to file an unfair labor practice charge against it based on § 8(a) of the Act
which contains prohibitions against employer conduct. See id. § 158(a). See also text ac-
companying note 49 infra.
10. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). In Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20
(1957), the Court expressly reserved judgment on the question of whether a state remedy was
appropriate for trespassory activity. The Court stated that "[wihether a state may frame and
enforce an injunction aimed narrowly at trespass" was an issue that the Supreme Court was
not free to rule on since the question had been raised by the state court on an erroneous
assumption that it had power to reach the union conduct in its entirety. 353 U.S. at 24-25.
11. The term "off-duty employee" is used to describe employees who are not working at
a given time on a shift for which they receive pay. In Diamond Shamrock Co. v. NLRB, 443
F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1971), the Third Circuit found that the rights of off-duty employees are
governed by the same considerations as those governing the rights of nonemployees and
thus required the employer to apply nonemployee access rules to regulate communications
by off-duty employees with those on-duty. Accord, GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921
(1973). But see Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976) (unless justified
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decision against the background of the Garmon line of cases and identify
questions raised by that decision concerning the protection of nonem-
ployee activities under the new preemption principle.
I. FEDERAL LABOR POLICY AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Garmon: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act grants to employees the
rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities
for mutual aid or protection.' 2 Although the Act does not expressly pro-
vide nonemployee union representatives with these rights, 3 the Supreme
Court has extended some protection to nonemployees and off-duty em-
ployees by recognizing that full vindication of employees' rights necessar-
ily depends upon organizational assistance by others.' 4 Thus, the rights of
nonemployees derive from the same section 7 protections afforded the em-
ployees whom their concerted conduct is to benefit.'" The Garmon rule
was intended to reserve for the NLRB, a specialized agency experienced in
labor-management relations, initial rulings on both section 7 employee
and nonemployee protections. 16
By remedying unfair labor practices that encroach on section 7 guaran-
tees, the Board effectuates the Act's policies nationally.' 7 Pre-Garmon
Supreme Court pronouncements on the role of state courts in labor dis-
putes, however, did little to further the uniform exercise of jurisdiction
by business reasons, a rule which denies off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and
other outside working areas is presumably invalid).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). For a discussion of circumstances that constitute "con-
certed" conduct within the meaning of the Act, see F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 97-99 (1977).
13. Section 7 of the Act applies only to employees. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The Act
defines employee under § 2(3) as "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any labor dispute or because of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular or substantially equivalent employment," subject to exclusions for individuals em-
ployed as agricultural laborers, domestic servants, independent contractors, supervisors, per-
sons employed by a spouse or family member, or persons employed by an employer subject
to the Railway Labor Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
14. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), the Court recognized that:
"[t]he right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to
learn the advantages of self-organization from others." Consequently, if the location of a
plant and living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reason-
able union efforts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the union to ap-
proach his employees on his property. Id at 113.
15. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
16. 359 U.S. at 245.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). See also note I supra.
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Congress had envisioned for the Board. The question of uniformity, in
fact, remained unresolved by the sparse litigation generated during the
Act's early years.' 8 When the Court did address the issue, its vacillation in
interpreting congressional intent to displace state law '9 and its reluctance
to articulate the circumstances that would justify preemption 21 contributed
to nonuniform assertion of Board jurisdiction. Nonetheless, one principle
arose undisputed: if certain activities were recognized by the Board as
clearly protected by section 7, state courts were prohibited by the
supremacy clause of the Constitution from adjudicating those activities.2 '
For this reason, conduct concededly protected by the Act has seldom been
the focus of preemption cases facing the Court.
Whether conduct subject to the Act's prohibitions would provide suffi-
cient justification to preempt state court authority was addressed in Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776.22 In Garner, a union representing a majority of
trucking employees picketed the docks of an interstate trucking company.
The employer sought to enjoin the picketing in state court, alleging that
the employees picketed in support of a union demand for recognition in
violation of Pennsylvania law. The Court held that the Pennsylvania court
was without authority because the Board has primary jurisdiction over
conduct in violation of section 8 of the Act.23 According to the Court's
18. Although the passage of "baby Wagner Acts" in the states of Massachusetts, New
York, and Wisconsin presented potential conflicts between state and federal regulation, the
risk of collision between these laws and the federal Act was minimized by the frequency of
interagency agreements. See A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 1048 (8th ed. 1977).
Moreover, the earliest cases in which the Court could have invoked the preemption rationale
were decided on first amendment grounds. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);
Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
19. See, e.g., Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 309 (1971) (White, J., dis-
senting); Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227 (1970) (Burger, J., concurring).
20. Compare Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (state court jurisdic-
tion preempted by the very enactment of federal legislation duplicating the local law) with
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (state court jurisdiction
not preempted in the absence of affirmative congressional approval of federal regulation);
Allen-Bradley Local, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) (state court jurisdiction not preempted when Congress has expressly left an
area of employee conduct open for state control).
21. Forms of economic pressure that the Court has found to be protected from em-
ployer interference include peaceful primary strikes and picketing on public property in
support of normal collective bargaining objectives. UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 456-59
(1950). The decision to preempt state court jurisdiction in such instances is grounded in
substantive rights derived from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. See,
e.g., Street Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963); Street Employees v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). See
also note 5 supra.
22. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
23. Id at 501.
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"primary jurisdiction" rationale, congressional intent to apply only federal
law to activity the Board was empowered to regulate was implied in the
very creation of the Board. Confining interpretation of the Act to a cen-
tralized expert authority was viewed as congressional recognition that a
"multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures provide incompati-
ble and conflicting adjudications."24
The more difficult question of appropriate jurisdiction for conduct
which the NLRA neither protects nor prohibits was first considered in Lo-
cal 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (Briggs-Strat-
ton).25 The Court itself in Briggs-Stratton examined the challenged
conduct, an intermittent work stoppage by employees, and concluded that
none of the section 7 protections or section 8 prohibitions applied in that
context. 26 Assuming that conduct not governed by federal law may be reg-
ulated by the states, the Court concluded that states may exercise jurisdic-
tion in situations in which the Court has established that "the Board lack[s]
authority to investigate, approve, or forbid the union conduct in ques-
tion."27 In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,28 the Court was
faced with the decision of whether to continue to engage in its own inter-
pretation of the Act's preemptive effect or defer to the judgment of the
Board in reliance on the primary jurisdiction rationale underlying Garner.
In Garmon, a minority union29 engaged in peaceful picketing to induce
customers and suppliers of the employer to stop dealing with it. The em-
ployer, contending that the purpose of this pressure was to gain union rec-
ognition, sought and obtained an injunction and damage award in a
California court.3 ° Reviewing the award for damages, the Supreme Court
24. 346 U.S. at 490-91.
25. 336 U.S. 245 (1949), overruled, 427 U.S. 152 (1976).
26. Although the Board has since determined that such "quickie strikes" violate the §
8(b)(3) proscription of refusal by a union to engage in collective bargaining with an em-
ployer, the Board's order in that case was set aside. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119
N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aftd, 361 U.S. 477
(1960).
27. 336 U.S. at 254.
28. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
29. A minority union is one that does not represent the majority of the employees in an
employee bargaining unit. Section 8(b)(4)(C) prohibits action, including picketing, by such
a union whose objective is to force the employer to recognize it when another union has
been certified as the bargaining representative of employees in the unit. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(4)(C) (1976).
30. At the time the employer filed the action in state court, the union had initiated a
representation proceeding before the Board. The Regional Director declined jurisdiction,
however, because the dispute lacked sufficient impact on interstate commerce. 359 U.S. at
238. See note 43 infira.
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reversed.3' In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court found that,
when conduct is even arguably within the scope of section 7 protections of
employee conduct or section 8 prohibitions against unfair labor practices,
state jurisdiction must yield.32 Garner was cited with approval for the
proposition that the Board's specialized knowledge and experience quali-
fied it to exercise primary jurisdiction over the disputed conduct and deter-
mine initially whether section 7 or section 8 applies.33
By way of exception, the Garmon Court recognized that overriding state
interests may justify departure from the general rule, absent "compelling
congressional direction" to the contrary. 34 Thus, two areas of regulation
were specifically reserved for state jurisdiction although conduct so classi-
fied may be either arguably protected or arguably prohibited by the Act:
(1) conduct that touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling and re-
sponsibility;35 and (2) conduct that is "merely a peripheral concern" of the
NLRA. In Garmon, the Court, in dicta, described the local interest excep-
tion as "violence and imminent threat to the public order"36 and the pe-
ripheral concern exception as a union's violation of a contractual duty to
its members.37 Both of these exceptions have gradually expanded. In Linn
31. 359 U.S. 236. The case was first decided together with Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), and Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S.
20 (1957). In each of these cases, state judgments were reversed insofar as they granted
equitable relief. In Garmon, however, the judgment for damages was vacated and re-
manded. When the California court sustained the damage award on remand, the union
again petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 359 U.S. at 238-39.
32. Id at 244.
33. Id at 242-43. Justice Harlan concurred on the narrow grounds that the picketing
was protected but stated that state courts should not yield to federal authority over dis-
putedly prohibited conduct. Id at 245 n.4 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Garmon Court's
choice to adopt the Garner doctrine of primary jurisdiction rather than the approach taken
in Briggs-Stratton was later affirmed in Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n (Kearney & Trecher), 427 U.S. 132 (1976). In Kearney & Trecher, certain conduct
neither prohibited nor protected by the Act was reserved for state regulation on the theory
that such conduct was intended by Congress to be "controlled by the free play of economic
forces." Id at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
34. 359 U.S. at 247-48.
35. Cf. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (employer's entrance obstructed by massed
striking employees); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (pickets' use of lan-
guage calculated to provoke violence); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954) (employer threatened by union representative with violent union shut-
down).
36. 359 U.S. at 247.
37. The principal case under this Garmon exception is IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958), which held that union members may bring suit against their unions in state court on
the ground that the union violated its contractual duties to its members even though the
union's conduct is arguably an unfair labor practice. But see United Ass'n of Journeymen v.
Borden Local 100, 373 U.S. 690, 696-98 (1963) (state court jurisdiction over dispute over
[Vol. 29:185
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v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, the Court allowed an employer to bring
an action for malicious libel against a union in state court under both the
local interest and peripheral concern exceptions. 38 More recently, both ex-
ceptions were invoked in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters.39 In
Farmer, a union member's spouse brought suit against her deceased hus-
band's union, alleging that its officials had caused him severe emotional
distress when it engaged in outrageous conduct, threats, and intimidation
following a dispute over internal union policies. Holding that the state
court had appropriately exercised jurisdiction, the Court stated that it
would no longer apply the Garmon principles inflexibly. Specifically, the
Court found that the question of whether state court jurisdiction is pre-
empted should be decided in light of the reasons underlying the Garmon
rationale;40 namely, the likelihood that state authority would result in un-
due interference with federally protected conduct and the role of the state
in protecting the interests of its citizens.4 '
Despite the reservations expressed in Farmer concerning how the Gar-
mon rule should be applied, the Court emphasized that Farmer and other
exceptions did not undermine the validity of Garmon as a basis for pre-
empting state court authority in most instances.42  To the contrary, the
Court has consistently applied the Garmon doctrine since its inception,
drawing exceptions to permit state authority over activity expressly ex-
cluded by Garmon or by statute.43 In each case in which the Court drew a
Garmon exception, the challenged conduct was arguably prohibited by
unlawful attempts by union to prevent members from obtaining work preempted because
not "primarily internal matters").
38. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
39. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
40. Id at 302-05.
41. Id
42. Id
43. The statutory exceptions include: (1) actions under § 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act for damages to business and property by union conduct violative of the § 8
(b)(4) proscriptions against secondary activity, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976); and (2) actions arising
under § 707(a) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 for breach
of collective bargaining agreements, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). In addition, § 14(c) was intro-
duced as part of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in 1959 in order to
abridge the hiatus in employer's civil remedies created by the Supreme Court's decision in
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). In Guss, the Court held that states
could not exercise jurisdiction over conduct proscribed by § 8 even when the NLRB has
refused to assert jurisdiction on the failure of the employer's business to engage sufficiently
in interstate commerce to meet the jurisdictional standards of the Board. The decision pre-
cluded such an employer from obtaining redress before any judicial forum. See Michelman,
State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643 n.14 (1961).
The subsequent incorporation of § 14(c) into the Act permitted state courts to assert jurisdic-
tion over such conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1976).
1979]
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section 8 of the Act. No exception, however, risked interference with the
federal interest involved in conduct arguably protected by section 7.44 In
fact, the Court in Farmer indicated that it would not permit state regula-
tion of such arguably protected conduct.45 Reaffirmation of Garmon by
the Court's statement in Farmer46 and apparent approval of the Garmon
doctrine by Congress in 197441 seemed to confirm the belief that Garmon
would continue to provide the framework for preemption cases actually or
potentially involving sections 7 or 8 of the Act.
B. The Sears Trespass Remedy
Although the Garmon principles have governed questions of labor pre-
emption throughout the doctrine's twenty-year history, members of the
Court have questioned the application of these principles in situations in-
volving nonemployee access to private property.48 Section 8(b) of the Act,
which enumerates types of union conduct justifying an unfair labor prac-
tice charge by an employer, does not prohibit a union's concerted activity
simply because it is conducted on private property. Unable to appeal di-
rectly to the Board, the employer may attempt to induce the union to file
44. See Address by Roger C. Hartley, before the Building Trades Lawyers Ass'n, The
Search for an Integrated Policy Regulating Construction Industry Picketing at 4, in Chicago,
Ill. (Oct. 30, 1978) (unpublished address in Catholic University Law School Library).
45. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 305.
46. See id at 297.
47. The extension of cdverage of the Act to benefit employees of health care institutions
has been interpreted by the General Counsel of the NLRB as tacit acceptance of the Gar-
mon preemption doctrine by Congress. Specifically, an amendment offered by Congress-
man Quie that would exempt state laws governing health care institutions, such as that of
Minnesota, from preemption under the NLRA was rejected by the House of Representa-
tives. 120 CONG. REC. 16,910 (1974). See Guidelines Issued by the General Counsel of the
NLRB for Use of Board Regional Offices in Unfair Labor Practice Cases Arising Under the
1974 Nonprofit Hospital Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, General Counsel Memoran-
dum 74-49 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in 1974 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK (BNA) 359.
48. In one such case, Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227 (1970), owners of a
grocery store sought to enjoin peaceful union picketing which had begun on public property
and later moved to a private walkway adjacent to the store entrance. A state court injunc-
tion against the pickets for trespass was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court. 283 Ala.
171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968). The United States Supreme Court first agreed to consider the
issue but later dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 397 U.S. at 223.
Two members of the Court issued separate opinions expressing opposite views on the pre-
emption issue. Justice Harlan considered the picketing "within the range of protections af-
forded by the Act" and, therefore, subject to Garmon preemption. Id at 230 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger, however, would have excepted the picketing from the
Garmon rule because of the state interest in protecting the property rights of its citizens. He
reasoned that the "local interest" exception was appropriate because an employer would
probably resort to self-help remedies to remove trespassers if remedies under state law were
foreclosed. Id at 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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an 8(a)(1) charge against the employer by ordering the union off its prop-
erty or threatening it with state trespass charges. Under Garmon, however,
the union may continue its activity without filing an 8(a)(1) charge with
the assurance that any trespass action brought by the employer challenging
the union conduct will be preempted if there is some arguable basis for
finding that the same aspect of the union conduct is protected or prohib-
ited by the Act.4 9 The question of whether the Court would require the
states to defer to the Board when no unfair labor practice charge triggered
a Board determination on the protected status of the union conduct was
the issue the Court addressed in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Counsel of Carpenters.
In Sears, the Court narrowed the scope of application of both the argua-
bly protected and arguably prohibited branches of the Garmon rule. Sears,
at variance with the terms of a master labor agreement prevailing in the
area, assigned work to carpenters who had not been dispatched by the hir-
ing hall of the local carpenters' union. Union agents requested that Sears
either hire a contractor who used dispatched carpenters or agree in writing
to comply with the terms of the master agreement. Receiving no response
from Sears, the union established peaceful picket lines on the privately
owned walkways and parking area surrounding the Sears building.50 Af-
ter an unsuccessful demand that the pickets leave, Sears filed a complaint
in the Superior Court of California seeking an injunction against the union
for continued trespass and obtained a temporary restraining order en-
joining the picketing. The union complied and the pickets never returned.
Thereafter, the court entered a preliminary injunction which was affirmed
by the California Court of Appeals. 5 The appellate court reasoned that
the value of real property to the employer and his right to peaceful posses-
sion were concerns so deeply rooted in local responsibility as to fall within
49. An employer's demand that union members leave the premises constitutes unlawful
interference with employees' § 7 rights and is proscribed by § (8)(a)(I) even when the de-
mand is not accompanied by threat of violence or state action to remove the trespassors.
Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 100 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1979), applicationfor
enforcement granted, No. 79-1248 (6th Cir. June 15, 1979). Alternatively, an employer may
resort to self-help remedies and forcibly remove the trespassers from the premises. See
Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83
HARV. L. REV. 552, 568 (1970).
50. At first, the union removed its pickets to public sidewalks adjacent to the Sears
building and parking lot, but, according to the testimony of union representatives, such pick-
eting was totally ineffective in communicating with the public. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 896, 553 P.2d
603, 606, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446 (1976).
51. 52 Cal. App. 3d 690, 125 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1975).
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the local interest exception to Garmon.12 The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia reversed, applying the Garmon principles to find that, since the union
picketing was both arguably protected and arguably prohibited under the
Act, the Board had primary jurisdiction over the dispute. 3
The United States Supreme Court refused to affirm the California
Supreme Court's "mechanical" application of the Garmon rule, insisting
instead that it would focus on the reasons underlying the rule.54 The
Court found that the only reason prohibited or arguably prohibited con-
duct is afforded exclusive Board jurisdiction is to eliminate the threat of
state interference with the Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce section 8
prohibitions." The Court reasoned that such a threat exists only when
identical controversies could be presented independently to both the Board
and the state court. If the same aspect of the challenged conduct is at issue
before each forum, state jurisdiction over the controversy is preempted.-6
In Sears, however, the aspect of union conduct arguably prohibited by
section 8 of the Act was not identical to the aspect of the conduct brought
before the state court. The Court noted that the only type of unfair labor
practice charges that Sears could have presented concerned whether the
picketing union had filed a petition for recognition by the employer57 or
had forced Sears to assign work to the carpenters' union members.5 8 Thus,
in either case, the Board would have questioned only the purpose of the
pickets' conduct. The state court in the trespass action, however, was un-
concerned with the purpose of the picketing; it considered only the loca-
tion. The controversies were, therefore, not sufficiently similar to trigger
52. 52 Cal. App. at 697, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 249. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text
.supra.
53. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 613, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976).
54. 436 U.S. at 188. The Court remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for
a resolution of whether the union's activity violated state law and whether under state law
the state was empowered to enjoin the activity. Id at 185. On remand, the California
Supreme Court found the picketing to be lawful activity under a California statute that
declared lawful any picketing "not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace where
any person or persons may lawfully be." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 527.3(b)(1) (West 1979).
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, No. 347511,
slip op. at 6-17 (Cal. Sept. 14, 1979).
55. 436 U.S. at 197.
56. This argument was advanced by Sears in its brief to the Court. Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 9, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978).
57. Id at 198. See also note 130 infra.
58. 436 U.S. at 198. Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act proscribes strikes and economic boy-
cotts whose object is to require an employer to assign work to employees of a certain labor
organization rather than others unless the employer has failed to conform to an order or
certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees perform-
ing such work. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1976).
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the primary jurisdiction rationale based upon the arguably prohibited
branch of Garmon.59
According to the Sears Court, the primary jurisdiction of the Board also
justifies preemption when the union activity is actually or arguably pro-
tected by federal law.6" Significantly, the Court specified that the risk of
state interference with federally protected rights would justify preemption
of state court authority only when an employer is unable to invoke Board
jurisdiction or induce its adversary to do so to determine whether the
union conduct is in fact protected.6 Since the carpenters' union did not
file an unfair labor practice charge upon instruction to leave the premises
and no section of the Act authorized Sears to do so, the Sears Court found
that preemption by primary jurisdiction was inappropriate on the premise
and that the picketing was protected by federal law.
The Court declared that protected or arguably protected conduct is sub-
ject to the Garmon principles for a second reason: the risk of state court
interference with section 7 rights.62 Accordingly, state courts, using the
Babcock accommodation principle, are to determine whether this risk is
sufficiently great to mandate preemption. The state courts must also bal-
ance the risk of an erroneous adjudication involving section 7 rights
against the "anomolous" consequence of denying the employer a forum in
which to litigate the trespass issue.6 3
The Sears decision does not specify the precise event that ousts state
court jurisdiction. In Justice Blackmun's view, federal preemption is trig-
gered the moment a union files an unfair labor practice charge against the
employer upon a company instruction to depart.' Justice Powell dis-
agreed with this conclusion in a separate concurrence suggesting that state
courts may interpret the majority's silence on this critical issue as approval
of an expanded state court role. As a prerequisite to preemption, Justice
Powell would require that the Board have actually asserted jurisdiction
59. Id
60. The term "primary jurisdiction" is used in the Court's opinion to signify the general
concept of Board preemption of state court jurisdiction over conduct subject to the general
unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board. 436 U.S. at 199.
61. Id at 201-02.
62. A third reason noted by the Court that protected conduct may invoke preemption
principles is a constitutional one applying to actually protected activity. See note 5 supra.
63. 436 U.S. at 206. Justice Blackmun noted in a concurring opinion that "[dielay in
remedy is desired by neither party in a labor dispute." Although the Board may seek disso-
lution of a state court order enjoining protected conduct under NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,
404 U.S. 138 (1971), such action would also entail delay. 436 U.S. at 210 & n.* (Blackmun,
J., concurring). See notes 71-76 and accompanying text infra.
64. d at 208-12.
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over the dispute by issuing a complaint against the employer.65 The major-
ity stated that the union's failure to file an 8(a)(1) charge was critical to its
holding but did not commit itself on the effect of the union's filing its
charge on state jurisdiction.66 Justice Brennan in his dissent pointed out
that the Court's members are divided in their interpretation of the conse-
quence of filing.67
The Court's failure to resolve the question of when state court jurisdic-
tion is preempted is significant because the timing of state court action will
critically affect a union's ability to influence the outcome of a labor dis-
pute. Picketing and handbilling, common forms of concerted conduct,
seek to redress union grievances by appealing to employers, employees, or
consumers patronizing employers. This is generally accomplished by pro-
testing grievances at times when conditions at the employer's place of busi-
ness are such that the union can reasonably expect to attain its objectives.
Thus, if a state court enjoins protected union activity before the issuance of
a complaint against the employer by the Board's General Counsel, accord-
ing to Justice Powell's interpretation, the union will be temporarily denied
the use of an economic, organizational, or informational tool. Despite a
favorable subsequent ruling by the Board, such a temporary restriction
would likely be fatal to the effectiveness of the union's activities. The Pow-
ell interpretation may, therefore, work to the union's detriment, but the
union may not be without its own tactical devices for forestalling such a
restraint. Under Justice Blackmun's interpretation, a state must yield its
authority immediately upon the filing of a charge with the General Coun-
sel's regional office. Thus, the union could simply file such a charge claim-
ing section 7 protection when it anticipated a state court trespass suit by its
employer, irrespective of the merits of the union's claim. Even if the claim
was frivolous, the employer would be compelled to endure the union's ac-
tivity at least until the General Counsel declines to issue a complaint.68
The union could thus prevent the immediate termination of its concerted
activities and thereby raise the probability that its conduct would produce
the desired pressure on the employer.
By either view, it is inevitable that, in some instances, one party to an
access dispute will be unable to make effective use of its state or Board
65. Id at 212-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Id at 207 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 233 n.44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. As Justice Powell observed, the Board is not empowered to issue or obtain from a
federal court a temporary restraining order enjoining the picketing under § 10(j) of the Act
until the General Counsel determines whether to issue a complaint. Id at 214 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976).
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remedy. An employer's effort to invoke its trespass remedy may be frus-
trated if a state court permits a union engaged in unprotected trespassory
activity to insulate itself from state court jurisdiction until the General
Counsel refuses to issue a complaint on the union's 8(a)(1) unfair labor
practice charge against the employer.69 Other state courts, however, may
bar a union from making effective use of its federal statutory remedy
against employer interference with concerted conduct by ordering the
union to vacate the premises of an employer, at least until the Board's
General Counsel issues a complaint against the employer. Thus, by grant-
ing the employer a remedy in state court without deciding whether the
court's jurisdiction would endure union efforts to invoke Board authority,
the Sears Court grants the state court the discretion to exercise significant
control over the remedial opportunities of the employers and unions in-
volved in labor disputes. In fact, Sears creates the risk that the pro-man-
agement or pro-union inclinations of each state court judge will be
outcome determinative.
II. NONEMPLOYEE ACCESS: TRACING THE Locus OF
ACCOMMODATION
The majority's reluctance in Sears to adopt Justice Blackmun's standard
for limiting state authority may be explained by Court dicta. The Court
suggested in Sears that the likelihood of protected nonemployee access to
private property was minimal, especially when the union's purpose was
69. In 1978, the median period from the date of filing of a charge to the issuance of a
complaint was 47 days. NLRB ANN. REP. 11 (Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. The time within which the region will decline to issue a
complaint upon the filing of a nonmeritorious charge is somewhat shorter. For example, it is
estimated that 30 days out of every 45-day period from the filing of a charge to complaint
issuance were attributable to investigation. Complaint preparation and voluntary adjust-
ment conferences accounted for the remaining 15 days. See E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRA-
TIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB, LAB. REL. & PUB. POLICY SERIES No. 16, at 41 (1978). The
General Counsel engages in efforts to promote a settlement before and after the determina-
tion of whether a given case presents a merit charge. Forty-eight percent of merit charges
during 1978 resulted in precomplaint settlements and adjustments. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
at 10. Furthermore, within limits, either party may prolong the settlement process. Delay in
complaint issuance in nonemployee access cases is further protracted by the placement of
cases relating to Hudgens, Giant Food, and Hutzler Brothers on the list of issues that are
mandatorily submitted to the Board's Regional Advice Branch. See GENERAL COUNSEL
MEMORANDUM (June 26, 1979). In addition, cases pertaining to preemption under Sears
have been designated by the General Counsel among those involving "novel, complex or
doubtful issues, or other policy considerations" which require the Regional Director to "be
especially careful in its research" and submit the case to the Advice Branch at its discretion.
GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM 78-79 (Dec. 13, 1978). It is from the Advice Branch
that the Board's Director for each geographic region seeks counsel on whether a complaint
should issue in cases involving unsettled areas of Board law and policy.
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nonorganizational. 70 It is arguable that, in declining to establish which
circumstances trigger preemptive Board authority, the Court assumed that
the Board would not protect conduct that state courts would prohibit as
trespassory.
A. The Babcock Accommodation
The argument that a union's conduct on private property is protected is
based on the limited right of nonemployee access implied in NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox. 7' In Babcock, nonemployee organizers were denied ac-
cess to an employer's privately owned parking lot for the purpose of
distributing union literature.72 The Court held that the union's conduct
was not protected because the union's accessibility to employees through
other channels was not sufficiently restricted to make organizational efforts
away from the employer's premises ineffective. 73 Conversely, "[w]hen in-
accessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
nonemployees to communicate with them through reasonable channels,"
nonemployees are justified under Babcock in engaging in organizational
activity on the employer's private property to the extent necessary to con-
vey the organizational message.7 4 By permitting limited access to nonem-
ployees, the Court sought to achieve an "accommodation" between the
organizational rights of the workers and the private property rights of the
employer.75 With due consideration for this accommodation of competing
interests, the Board was to determine whether an employer had violated
70. See text accompanying note 99 infra.
71. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). In each of the three cases consolidated for Court review, the
Board held that the employer had unreasonably interfered with employees' right to self-
organization in violation of § 8(a)(1) by denying the organizers access to company property.
The Board found that it would be unreasonably difficult for union representatives to reach
employees outside company property. Id at 106. In issuing its order, the Board relied on
the Supreme Court decision in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968), which held that nonemployee union members enjoyed a first amendment
right to engage in peaceful picketing on a privately owned shopping center. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits disagreed with the Board's deci-
sion in Babcock and denied enforcement. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316
(5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's order. NLRB v. Ranco, Inc.,
222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955). The unions in Babcock and Seamprufe and the employer in
Ranco petitioned for certiorari.
72. 351 U.S. at 114.
73. The Court observed that the plants were located near small, well-settled communi-
ties where "the usual methods of imparting information" were available. Id
74. Id For an illustration of a plant community's demographic characteristics clearly
requiring a Board accommodation contrary to that of Babcock, see Broomfield, supra note
49, at 562 n.65.
75. 351 U.S. at 113-14.
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section 8(a)(1) by denying the union access. After Babcock, the Court de-
lineated the Board's role in access cases as that of fixing the locus of the
accommodation, which falls in each case "at differing points along the
spectrum depending on the strength of the respective section 7 rights and
property rights asserted in any given context. 76
Since Babcock, the Board has been cautious in permitting private access
by organizers. 77 In such cases, the Board has inquired into the reasonable-
ness of requiring unions to resort to alternative channels of communica-
tion and, in most instances, the adequacy of union efforts to utilize those
channels. In addition to locating an organizational drive on public prop-
erty, these channels include: telephoning employees; mailing them union
literature; visiting them at their homes; and attracting their attention to the
organizational drive by organizational meetings, newspaper, television and
radio advertising, bumper stickers, placards, and loud-speakers.78 In de-
termining whether any one or combination of these alternatives is reason-
able and adequately utilized, the Board has varied its standards of
accommodation according to the nature of the employment context.
I. Live-In Employee Facilities
The Board has frequently granted unions access to private premises
when the employees to be organized live on the employer's business prop-
erty. In company towns and resort hotels, for example, a union may not
have a reasonable opportunity to communicate with employees who do
not leave the premises or do so at unpredictable intervals.79 Organization
drives are often further impaired when the employees' telephone and room
numbers are unavailable to the union for mail and telephone messages and
when staggered work shifts prevent mass media appeals from reaching the
employees at any one time during the day. The Board has generally ap-
proved union access under these or similar circumstances even though the
use of alternative channels of communication may have been incom-
plete.8" Employers, however, have often successfully challenged enforce-
76. NLRB v. Hudgens, 414 U.S. at 522.
77. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text infra.
78. See Rochester Gen. Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 97 L.R.R.M. 1410 (1978).
79. Prior to Babcock, the Board recognized that, for an organizational drive on a lum-
ber camp to be successful, organizers must have access to the living quarters of employees.
See NLRB. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 178 (1946), enforced, 167 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1948).
80. See, e.g., New Pines, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 944 (1971), enforcement denied, 468 F.2d
427 (2d Cir. 1972); Tamiment, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1970), enforcement denied, 451 F.2d
794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972); Kutsher's Hotel & Club, 175 N.L.R.B.
1114, enforcement denied, 427 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1970); S. & H. Grossinger, Inc., 156
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ment of these Board orders in federal circuit courts8 on the ground that
the record evidence does not substantially support the Board's conclusion
that union efforts to reach employees through alternative channels were
sufficient. s2
In contrast to cases involving company towns, the Board has been more
explicit in establishing the burden a union must sustain to board water
vessels lawfully for organizational purposes. Such cases present at least
two circumstances unique to that employment setting. First, the perma-
nent residences of employees housed on ships are frequently dispersed
throughout a wide geographic area.83 Second, union agents have difficulty
in timing their visits to docks to coincide with crew changes when seamen
normally board and disembark.84 Thus, the accommodation the Board
has struck for organizing ship employees has seldom resulted in their ex-
clusion from private vessels.8 5 In one such case, Sabine Towing & Trans-
N.L.R.B. 233 (1956), enforced as modied, 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967); Joseph Bancroft &
Sons, Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1953).
81. Because orders by the Board are not self-enforcing, a union is required to seek en-
forcement of an order in the appropriate federal court of appeals if an employer found to
have violated § 8(a) refuses to comply with the order. The employer in such an instance
may also appeal to a federal court of appeals by filing an application for review of the order
in that court.
82. In a § 8(a)(I) action, a reviewing court may deny enforcement of a Board order if,
on the record as a whole, the finding that the employer interfered with union § 7 rights is not
supported by substantial evidence. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (195 1).
Compare NLRB v. S. & H. Grossinger, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967) (union effort ade-
quate when employer resistance to union's use of alternative channels is part of a general
pattern of employer hostility) with NLRB v. New Pines, Inc., 468 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1972)
(union effort inadequate when union did not take advantage of times when employer had
not barred organizers from visiting employees in their living quarters); NLRB v. Tamiment,
Inc., 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971) (union effort inadequate when limited to an unsuccessful
canvassing campaign at plant gate and nearby tavern); NLRB v. Kutsher's Hotel & Club,
427 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1970) (union effort inadequate when union failed to solicit live-in
employees who crossed a public road to and from meals and work stations).
83. See, e.g., Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 63, 99 L.R.R.M. 1566 (1973), appli-
cation/or enforcement granted, No. 78-3343 (5th Cir. Dec. 26, 1978) (employees' residences
dispersed throughout the state of Florida); Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423
(1973), enforced as modied, 599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979) (207 employees' residences dis-
persed throughout the state of Texas and 61 employees having mailing addresses in eight
other states); NLRB v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 472 F.2d 753, 754 (8th
Cir. 1973) (employees' residences in 15 different states).
84. See Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423 (1973), enforced as modified,
599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 63,99 L.R.R.M. 1566 (1973), appli-
cation for enforcement granted, No. 78-3343 (5th Cir. Dec. 26, 1978); Sabine Towing &
Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423 (1973), enforced as modfled, 599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979);
Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971), enforcement denied,
472 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973); Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972) (ore processing
plant employees who live and work on a remote island deemed "isolated from normal con-
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portation Co. ,86 the Board noted that the employer bears the burden of
proving that union efforts are inadequate.87 The Fifth Circuit, however,
rejected the Board's allocation of the burden and denied enforcement to
the pertinent portion of the Board's order.88 Under a different rationale,
the Eighth Circuit, in NLRB v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines,
Inc., denied enforcement to an earlier boat-access Board order. 89 In
Sioux City, the court considered the right of the employer to conduct its
operations free from interference with ship discipline and production.9°
The court found that implementation of the Board's order would require
substantial expenditure of time and energy by the employer to direct union
representatives through the boat's boarding and disembarking proce-
dures.9 In both Sioux City and Sabine Towing, the circuit courts criti-
cized the Board's approval of union access by rejecting Board findings that
the unions had made a sufficient showing of the ineffectiveness of alterna-
tive channels of communication with employees.92
2. Other Single-Employer Facilities
In the common business environment of a single industrial plant, retail
store, or hospital, the Board has applied a more rigid standard of evaluat-
ing the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative union efforts. A union
may reasonably be expected to organize employees of such a facility in
public accessways to the company grounds and by mass media appeals. In
a large urban area, however, the latter channel may be foreclosed. The
number of newspapers or radio and television broadcasts employees are
exposed to during off-duty times may be so numerous that the union can-
not expect to reach more than a small fraction of the employees with a
reasonable investment in these media. The Board has, nonetheless, re-
fused to approve union access to an employer's plant solely on the basis of
the expense and inconvenience the union would incur in resorting to the
tact"). But see Bludworth Constr. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 385, 387 (1959) (other channels by
which tugboat employees may be reached unspecified).
86. 205 N.L.R.B. 423 (1973), enforced as mod#Fled, 599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979).
87. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. at 424.
88. 599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. 472 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973).
90. Id at 755-56. Restrictions on employees' right to discuss self-organization may be
based only upon a showing by the employer that the restriction is necessary to maintain
production and discipline. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n.10
(1945).
91. 472 F.2d at 756.
92. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d at 665; NLRB v. Sioux City &
New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 472 F.2d at 756.
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mass media.93
The responsibility of a union for contacting employees by telephone,
mail, and home visits is also substantial in most single-employer settings.
To meet the Board's standards of adequacy, a union may be required to
solicit actively the employer's cooperation in obtaining a list of employ-
ees, 94 compile a list of its own through a check of employee license
plates, 95 and ensure that its list is comprehensive and up-to-date. 96 The
Board has required no less adequate an effort by the union when traffic
hazards at company entrances deter organizers from safely conducting li-
cense plate checks.97 On the other hand, if the union is successful in ob-
taining the employee list and pursues a significant number of employees
through the mail or at home, its effort may be sufficient, in the Board's
view, to constitute effective use of alternatives and thus result in the
Board's denial of access.98
Supported by Board precedent governing union access to traditional em-
ployer establishments, the Court in Sears made this observation: "That the
burden imposed on the union is a heavy one is evidenced by the fact that
the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock accom-
modation principle has rarely been in favor of trespassory organizational
activity." 99 The Court's conclusion from Board cases involving traditional
single-employer facilities that the accommodation struck in favor of such
employers' property rights is the general rule" inaccurately represents
93. See Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 707 n.7 (1971). See also Falk
Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 721 (1971); Farah Mfg. Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 601, 617 (1970), en-
forced, 450 F.2d 942 (1971) ("One would think that the best way to determine the efficacy of
such an effort would be to make it."); General Dynamics/Telecommunications, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1725, 1728 (1962).
94. See Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705 (1971) (organizers' unsuccessful ef-
fort to secure employee list significant to union's ability to hold organizational meetings).
95. See Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543, 545 (1972).
96. See Falk Corp, 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 720 (1971).
97. See Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972). The question of or-
ganizers' safety at plant gates for any organizational purpose has been of limited persuasive-
ness in influencing the Board to accommodate the organizers' § 7 rights. See Farah Mfg.
Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 601 (1970), enforced, 450 F.2d 942 (1971). But see Schoelle Chem.
Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 724, 730 (1971), enforced, 82 L.R.R.M. 2410 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973) (safety factor combined with strong union effort to acquire nonem-
ployee list sufficient to render use of alternative channels of communication ineffective).
98. See General Dynamics/Telecommunications, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1725, 1728 (1962).
99. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. at
205.
100. Id at 236 n.41.
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this employment context as prototypical of the American workplace.
3. Multiple-Employer Facilities Open to the Public
The emergence of business settings distinct from traditional single-em-
ployer facilities has influenced the Board to modify its approach to balanc-
ing section 7 and private property interests.' 0 ' When an employer locates
its business on leased premises shared by other businesses and open to the
general public, it may not be insulated from nonemployee organizational
activity. A prime obstacle facing union organizers on this type of property
is the difficulty they normally encounter in distinguishing target employees
from employees, customers, and suppliers of other businesses on the prem-
ises. In contrast, the employer is faced with the similarity of its property's
functional characteristics to those of a normal business district from which
no property interest would justify the union's exclusion.' 2
In Solo Cup Co.,103 the Board approved union access to solicit employ-
ees on a privately owned industrial park. The union sought access to this
industrial complex only after organizational efforts at a public area proved
futile and unsafe. The Board concluded that, although the union used no
other alternative channels, it had made reasonable attempts at organizing
outside the private grounds."° The fact that the general public was not
excluded from the premises was a significant factor in the decision.'0 5
101. As consumer-oriented industries adapted their marketing techniques to the needs of
densely populated suburban areas, the public increased its reliance on privately owned
shopping malls for retail purchases, recreational facilities, and even professional services.
Between 1960 and 1977, the number of shopping centers in the United States increased from
fewer than 4000 to over 18,000. Warner, Suburbia's Gift to the Cities, in 19 HORIZON 12
(Sept. 11, 1977). During 1973 alone, 1,600 centers were built. See Why Shopping Centers
Rode Out the Storm, in 119 FORBES 35 (June 1, 1976). The commercial success of mall
establishments has influenced urban developers to include shopping malls in their plans for
revitalizing the downtown sections of major United States metropolitan areas. See Warner,
supra at 12. Innovative developers have increased the consumer appeal of shopping centers
by introducing "mixed use" centers with nonretailing attractions. Developers credit the suc-
cess of the University Towne Center in San Diego, for example, to the 17% leasable space
within the center devoted to attractions such as an ice skating rink, a preschool day-care
center, a folk art museum, discotheques, community meeting rooms, classrooms for univer-
sity extension courses, and facilities for YMCA exercise classes. See A Spurt in Shopping
Centers, in BUSINESS WEEK 92 (Jan 15, 1979). Given the investment incentive to corporate
and individual investors in this relatively new form of commercial property, it can be ex-
pected that, as the number, of these complexes grows, the frequency of access disputes on
leased premises will increase proportionately.
102. See Central Hardware, 181 N.L.R.B. 491,500(1970), enforced as mod#Fed, 439 F.2d
1321 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
103. 172 N.L.R.B. 1110, enforcement denied, 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970).
104. Id at 1110-11.
105. Id at 1111.
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In Central Hardware, the Board extended the concept of quasi-public
property implied in Solo Cup to organizational activity on the parking lot
of a single retail store.' 6 The Board considered the quasi-public nature of
the property as a blanket protection to the union's conduct and did not
weigh other factors to strike an accommodation. Although it recognized
that the union could have pursued employees through other methods, the
Board summarily dismissed these methods as ineffective." 7 The United
States Supreme Court upheld an Eighth Circuit decision denying enforce-
ment in that case. The Court found that by protecting the union's conduct
without inquiry into variables other than the openness of the employer's
premises, the Board had ruled inconsistently with the Babcock princi-
ple. 10
8
More recently, in Hutzler Brothers Co.," °9 the Board again considered
the concept of property openness. In that case, organizers distributed
handbills to department store employees at a public entrance that employ-
ees were required to use as they came on and off duty before and after
business hours. Eighty percent of the Hutzler Brothers' employees who
drove to work arrived at the employee entrance through a four-lane ac-
cessway which the employer shared with an adjacent thirty-to-forty store
shopping center. Although the union had not attempted alternative meth-
ods of conveying its message to employees, the Administrative Law Judge
examined each of the possible alternatives and concluded that the em-
ployer had unlawfully interfered with the union's section 7 rights by de-
manding that it depart from its position at the store entrance. A major
factor considered in the balance was the employer's voluntary dilution of
its own private property interest by opening its property to the public."o
In Hutzler Brothers, the points of ingress and egress for the employer's
store were identical to those of the shopping center through which
thousands of vehicles traveled daily."' Thus, the effectiveness of reason-
able alternative channels of communication to reach employees could be
106. 181 N.L.R.B. 491 (1970), enforced as modified, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971), va-
cated, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
107. The Board found, for example, that it was impractical for the union to make use of
its "fairly complete list" of employees' names and addresses when employees were more
often than not away from their homes when union representatives called. Id. at 496.
108. 407 U.S. at 546-48. The court found on remand that the Board's finding that there
were no reasonable alternative means of communicating with employees was not supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Central Hardware v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 252,
256 (8th Cir. 1972).
109. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 101 L.R.R.M. 1062, application for enforcement granted, No.
79-1252 (4th Cir. June 4, 1979).
110. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 141 at 9-10.
111. Id at 7.
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no greater than where an employer's store is located on the shopping mall
itself. Unlike Central Hardware, in which the Board's grant of access
turned on the quasi-public character of the employment setting, Hutzler
Brothers represented an accommodation of competing rights in which the
public nature of the business property was but one factor that was
weighed." 2 Thus, the Board recognized in Hutzler Brothers that the
design of business property for public use may be a physical obstacle to
employee organization if an organizational drive is barred from the prop-
erty. It can be expected that, in similar cases, the Board will more readily
sanction nonemployee access than in traditional employment settings
where an employer has acted affirmatively to ensure the privacy of its busi-
ness.
B. Accommodating Strikers
The Babcock accommodation was first thought to apply only to organi-
zational activity, but in 1976 the principle was extended to peaceful eco-
nomic picketing in Hudgens v. NLRB." 1 3 In support of a lawful economic
strike, striking employees who worked at a remote warehouse picketed in
front of a store leased by their employer in Hudgens' shopping center.
Threatened with arrest for criminal trespass by the shopping center's gen-
eral manager, the pickets filed an 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice charge
against Hudgens, the shopping center owner. The Board issued a prelimi-
nary cease-and-desist order against Hudgens, which it later affirmed.
Adopting the findings and recommendations of an Administrative Law
Judge, who held that Hudgens had unlawfully interfered with the pickets'
protected conduct," 4 the Board concluded that, irrespective of the exist-
ence of alternative means for organizers to communicate with employees,
the pickets' presence was within the scope of the owner's invitation to
members of the general public to do business at the store." 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order, partly on first
amendment grounds." 6 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
112. 1d at 10.
113. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
114. Id at 511. In issuing the order, the Board relied on the Supreme Court decision in
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which held that
nonemployee union members enjoy a first amendment right to engage in peaceful picketing
on a privately owned shopping center.
115. Scott Hudgens, 205 N.L.R.B. 628, 631-32 (1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
116. The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
409 U.S. 551 (1972), which required that, for a union to enter private property permissibly,
organizational opportunities at locations less intrusive upon the owner's property must be
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held that the pickets enjoyed no constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression but remanded the case to the Board for a determination consis-
tent with the Babcock criteria." 7 The Court stated that the Board, in
reaching an accommodation, must inquire into the nature of the chal-
lenged conduct and the business property on which it takes place. Only
upon such inquiry would the Board act consistently with the "basic objec-
tive under the Act" of striking a balance between section 7 and private
property rights "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other.""' 8 On remand, the Board applied the Babcock
analysis and found that Hudgens' property interest must yield to the pick-
ets' section 7 rights." 9
To accommodate the union's picketing, the Board considered the type of
picketing involved, the intended audience, and the identity of the pickets.
Because lawful economic rather than organizational activity was involved,
the Board noted that the pickets' intended audience comprised two groups:
(1) consumers at the mall who might be influenced to purchase items from
the target store after viewing the store's window display; and (2) employees
of the target store. Additionally, the Board found the pickets were em-
ployees of the picketed store, though not of the property owner-lessor.
120
The Board further noted that to require pickets to communicate by media
would be unreasonable, especially in view of Board and Court precedent
recognizing and protecting economic picketing as the most effective means
of dissuading those who would enter a struck employer's premises. 1 l Fi-
nally, the Board found it inappropriate to require the pickets to resort to
property which did not encroach on Hudgens' property interest since, in a
complex of sixty stores, a picket line at the closest public area would be too
remote to be meaningful. 2
2
Since Hudgens, the Board has extended protection to pickets located on
other types of private property open to the public such as industrial
parks. 23 In a recent decision, Seattle-First National Bank, 124 it accommo-
either unavailable or insufficient. The Court found that the Board's General Counsel had
met the burden of proof in that case. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 1974).
117. 424 U.S. at 512-21.
118. Id at 521 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)).
119. The Board observed that to hold otherwise would enable employers to insulate
themselves from § 7 activity by simply fronting their business on leased premises on private
malls. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 418 (1977). No appeal was taken in Hudgens on
remand.
120. 230 N.L.R.B. at 416.
121. Id at 416-17 (citing United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.) 376
U.S. 492, 499 (1964)).
122. 230 N.L.R.B. at 417.
123. See Holland Rantos Co., 234 N.L.R.B. No.113,97 L.R.R.M. 1376, enforced sub
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dated the statutory rights of employee pickets who had sought access to the
foyer of a restaurant on the forty-sixth floor of a bank building. The bank,
which was the owner of the building, leased space to the employer restau-
rant. Finding the factual setting analagous to that in Hudgens, the Board
held that the owner's property rights must yield to the restaurant employ-
ees' section 7 rights.'25 In so holding, the Board has affirmed its position in
Hudgens that the context of union concerted conduct may be a determi-
nant of whether such conduct is protected.
III. "CONTENT AND CONTEXT" OF UNION CONCERTED CONDUCT: A
MATRIX OF COMPETING INTERESTS
In contrast to the Court's pronouncement in Sears that access to private
property is more likely to be unprotected than protected, the Board's ac-
commodation of the competing interests in access cases has never been one
of flat prohibitions. In Hudgens, the Court characterized the Board's role
as one of "adapting the Act to changing patterns of industrial life."' 26 In
response to the Hudgens mandate that it reach an accommodation based
on considerations of the "content and context" of the section 7 right being
asserted, 2 7 the Court has evaluated property rights and nonemployee ac-
cess rights in terms of a conceptual matrix whose axes comprise the form
of union concerted conduct and the nature of the business property on
which the activities take place.128
.4. Area Standards Picketing
The Sears pickets argued that they were entitled to a Board determina-
tion that their picketing was protected activity because the purpose of their
protest was to enforce area standards. Unions such as the Sears pickets
participate in area standards picketing to protect the standards of wages
and benefits they have successfully negotiated in a community from the
unfair competitive advantage that an employer with lower labor costs en-
joys when it opens for business in that community. 129 By appealing to
nom. Eisenberg v. Holland Rantos Co., 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978). Cf. Peddie Bldgs., 203
N.L.R.B. 265 (1973), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.
1974) (pre-Hudgens).
124. 243 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 101 L.R.R.M. 1537, application for enforcement granted, No.
79-7509 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1979).
125. 101 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
126. 424 U.S. at 523 (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)).
127. 424 U.S. at 521.
128. See note 101 supra.
129. See Area Standards Picketing: The Union Stake in the Wage-Scale Game, [1978 4
LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9166.
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potential customers of the employer to avoid doing business with it, the
pickets attempt to bring pressure on the employer to meet the area's wage
and benefit standards. Area standards picketing has recently been ex-
amined and approved in situations that would, but for an area standards
object, be considered unlawful union attempts to seek recognition from an
employer whose employees the union does not represent.13
0
It is certain that access to privately owned shopping malls by area stan-
dards pickets will be the target of employer trespass challenges. Unions
may find it necessary to conduct their protests on the private accessways
surrounding individual business locations in order to reach the customers
to whom their message is directed. Since unions engage in this type of
protest to protect interests of employees other than those of the target em-
ployer, the participants will normally be nonemployees. Under these cir-
cumstances the Board has determined in Giant Food, Inc. 131 that area
standards picketing is both lawful and affirmatively protected under sec-
tion 7.
In Giant Food, a retail employer occupying leased space in a two-store
shopping center was found to have unlawfully interfered with area stan-
dard pickets' section 7 rights when it demanded that the pickets leave the
property. In accommodating the interests of the employer and the pickets'
union, the Board assessed the nature of the union activity and the em-
ployer's location. The factors the Board considered before concluding that
access to the employer's location was reasonably necessary for the union to
assert its rights were: (1) the presence at the shopping center of the em-
ployer with whom the union had its dispute; (2) the likelihood that condi-
tions at the public roadway to the center would prevent a distracted driver
from receiving the union message from outside the center; (3) in view of
the number of stores the customers could patronize at the center, the abil-
ity of pickets to ascertain the identity of customers of the target store from
the public roadway; (4) the likelihood that the union's position at the en-
130. Section 8(b)(7) of the Act proscribes picketing by a union not currently certified
when a bar exists to the raising of a question concerning a union's representation of the
employees in that bargaining unit, and when the union's object is to require the employer to
recognize or bargain with that union (recognitional picketing) or to require employees to
accept that union as their exclusive bargaining representative (organizational picketing). A
question concerning representation cannot be raised when: (1) an employer has lawfully
recognized another union; and (2) a valid election has been held within 12 months. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A-B) (1976). It is also unlawful under § 8(b)(7) to picket with an organi-
zational or recognitional objective when no representation petition has been filed by the
uncertified union within a reasonable time from the commencement of the picketing not to
exceed 30 days. Id § 158(b)(7)(C).
131. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 101 L.R.R.M. 1598, applicationfor review granted, No. 79-
1248 (6th Cir. June 15, 1979).
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trance to the complex would enmesh neutral shopping center employers in
its dispute with the target store; and (5) the location of the union protest on
property which was open to the public. The fact that the pickets were
nonemployees was also considered significant to the Board's accommoda-
tion. 132
Although the locus of the Babcock accommodation of section 7 and
property interests differs in each case in which the principle is applied, 133
there is good reason to assume that the Giant Food analysis would apply
with equal force to hold such picketing protected at most other shopping
center locations. Unlike most other shopping complexes, the center to
which the Giant Food pickets were allowed access contained only two
stores. This minimized the difficulty pickets would have encountered in
identifying employees of the target store from outside the center. More-
over, the Board struck a balance in favor of the Giant Food pickets' statu-
tory rights despite the fact that the pickets had attempted no alternative
means of attracting customers' attention such as by mass communications
or the use of loudspeakers from public roadways. Although the Giant
Food decision does not contain a detailed consideration of the distances
between store entrances or from the stores to the public roadway, shopping
centers are not so varied in their design of accessways and store proximity
that picketing on other such property could be meaningfully distinguished
from the facts in Giant Food. In holding union conduct protected in a
context similar to those where unions have traditionally been denied com-
pany access,' 34 the Board attributed special importance to the content of
the area standards message as a factor favoring union access. If the
Board's decision is upheld on review, the Sears dicta that area standards
picketing on private property is more likely unprotected than protected
will be in direct contradiction to Board precedent. Until the Court clarifies
the position it took in Sears, state court reliance on the Sears dicta may
result in erroneous state court prohibitions of protected conduct.
Even if state courts rely on Giant Food for guidance in accommodating
the respective employer and union interests in area standards cases, it is
doubtful that such courts, in deciding whether to issue an injunction,
132. 101 L.R.R.M. at 1600-01. The union began distributing handbills to customers the
day Giant Food began operating its store in Knoxville, Tennessee. Although none of the
pickets was a Giant Food employee, some had been employees of a store which formerly
occupied the same space as Giant Food. Pickets' signs read: "Informational picketing -
Giant Food Markets does not pay area standards wages and benefits. Please don't shop.
Retail Clerks Union 1557, 203 North I th Street, Nashville, Tennessee." Id at 1598.
133. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112.
134. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text supra.
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would inquire into all issues the Board would consider relevant in deter-
mining whether the conduct is protected. The Board has found, for exam-
ple, that for a union to defend successfully its activity as area standards
conduct against an employer's 8(b)(7) charge, the union must have made
reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the employer actually pays em-
ployees substandard compensation.' 35 Thus, whether a union has made
such attempts is a relevant issue for a state court to consider. Equally rele-
vant is the question whether the picketing union would require the em-
ployer to pay union scale wages in the future. Such an objective would be
an unlawful recognitional attempt by the union to declare itself negotiator
of wages. 136 In general, if the union message were not conveyed in full
conformity with the consumer publicity proviso to the section 8(b)(7)(C)
prohibitions against organizational and recognitional picketing, the object
of the picketing would be unlawful.' 37 Failure of state courts to consider
such questions could result in their refusal to enjoin picketing even though
the Board would subsequently decline to assert jurisdiction, finding the
conduct unprotected. Although state court misapplications of Board law
to protect picketing that the Board would prohibit pose no threat to the
interests Sears identified as underlying the preemption doctrine, they
would interfere with uniform administration of the Act.
If, on the other hand, state courts rely on the Sears dicta to enjoin
trespassory area standirds picketing before a Board complaint is issued,
the action may impact gravely on the success of the picketing effort. Area
standards picketing is generally organized to coincide with the commence-
ment of business operations by the employer whose compensation is sub-
standard.'8 Whether the picketing effort succeeds depends largely on the
135. See Building and Constr. Trades Council (Pettinaro Constr. Co.), 230 N.L.R.B. 42
(1977), enforced as modified, 578 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1978) (union scale wages paid to only one
employee); Carpenters Local 745 (James W. Glover Ltd.), 178 N.L.R.B. 684 (1969), en-
forced, 450 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1971) (union base wages and fringes in excess of those re-
quired by law paid to employees).
136. Centralia Bldg. Trades Council v. NLRB, 155 N.L.R.B. 803 (1965), enforced, 363
F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
137. As a proviso to § 8(b)(7)(C) prohibitions against organizational and recognitional
picketing, the Act states:
Nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or
other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consum-
ers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor
organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual em-
ployed by any other person in the course of his employment not to pick up, deliver
or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976). See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 12,
at 120-21.
138. See note 132 supra.
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union's ability to convey its message to customers before the employer has
built up a body of loyal customers. If an employer can promptly appeal to
a state court to enjoin protected picketing at the outset of the union's pro-
test, the strength of the pickets' ability to influence the public and thus
defend area wage scales is substantially diminished.
B. Organizational Solicitation
According to the Sears majority, whatever protection the Board would
extend to area standards picketing is likely to be less than that accorded
nonemployee union organizers at the same location. 39 Moreover, organi-
zational pickets are saddled with a heavy burden of proving that their ef-
forts at using alternative channels of communication were ineffective
before lawfully obtaining access to the private grounds. 4 ° However, the
Court's reliance on Babcock to support these assertions is unjustified. Bab-
cock required only that a union make "reasonable" efforts to communi-
cate by other means before it may lawfully enter the private premises.' 4 '
Moreover, the Board itself was entrusted with the responsibility of striking
the accommodation.142 Contrary to the Court's dicta in Sears, the union's
burden in satisfying the Babcock requirement of reasonableness has not
always been a rigorous one under Board law. Rather, as the Babcock
principle has been applied to different employment settings, different stan-
dards have emerged. In the past, the Board has imposed a substantial bur-
den on unions seeking to organize employees of employers situated in
traditional industrial plant settings. As the nature of business property has
changed, however, the Board has recognized new restrictions on a union's
ability to reasonably utilize alternative channels of communicating its
message to employees.
In Hutzler Brothers, the Board squarely faced the onerous burden a
union undertakes when it attempts to organize employees at consumer
shopping malls and related property. In striking its balance in favor of the
nonemployee organizers, the Board recognized the relatively minor en-
croachment union organizers pose to an employer's property interest when
the same organizers would be welcome on the property for most nonor-
ganizational purposes. The conflict between the approach taken by the
Board in cases such as Hutzler Brothers and the Court's statement on ade-
quate use of alternative channels of communication in Sears is more than
139. 436 U.S. at 205 n.42.
140. Id at 205 n.41.
141. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
142. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112.
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academic. The Fifth Circuit, in denying enforcement in Sabine Towing,
has already relied heavily on the language in Sears to deny nonemployee
organizers access to ships, thereby undercutting a well-established Board
standard for that unique employment setting. 143 It is reasonable to assume
that, unless clarification of the Sears pronouncement is forthcoming, the
Board's accommodations in Hutzler Brothers and future cases involving
locations open to the public will also be denied enforcement.
The Court's exaggerated view of restrictions imposed on nonemployee
organization efforts may also be adopted by state courts. As with area
standards activity, the consequences to unions of erroneous decisions to
exclude them in their efforts to organize are severe. If organizational ef-
forts are judicially terminated after an organizational campaign has gained
momentum, an employer may take advantage of the interval following the
injunction to undermine what support the union has generated up to that
time.'44 If the employer is successful in this endeavor, it might eliminate
the union threat altogether, irrespective of whether it is later found in vio-
lation of section 8(a).
C Economic Picketing
The timing of the state court injunction is of equal or greater signifi-
cance if the erroneously enjoined conduct is picketing in support of a law-
ful economic objective. A major purpose of the Act is to entrust the Board
with power to balance the resources available to labor and management in
bringing economic pressure against each other to accomplish their respec-
tive objectives. 145 In an economic strike, the Board meets the congres-
sional mandate of striking this balance by granting protection to
employees in their use of certain economic sanctions under section 7, while
prohibiting both labor and management from using others under section
8.146 If protected economic picketing by nonemployees is enjoined pursu-
143. See text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
144. One means by which an employer accomplishes this is by assembling employees on
company time to make antiunion speeches. Under the Board's rule in Livingston Shirt Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953), an employer may not lawfully conduct such a speech when it has
promulgated an unlawful no-solicitation rule. Id at 409. If an employer unlawfully ex-
cludes organizers from its premises and such organizers are erroneously enjoined by a state
court, the employer may be twice in violation of § 8(a)(l) when it conducts its antiunion
speech. Nonetheless, the employer would have accomplished the intended diminution of
union support, and, in such circumstances, the Board would be reluctant to issue a bargain-
ing order forcing the employer to recognize and bargain with the defeated union. See
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. No. 179, 101 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1979).
145. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 12, at 95-149.
146. Pressure may be brought by employees in the form of strikes, picketing, and boy-
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ant to a trespass action, a union may be prohibited from exercising its sec-
tion 7 rights for the duration of a strike and be forced to make economic
concessions it would not have otherwise made in collective bargaining.
Correspondingly, if the injunction does not issue until the Board declines
to issue a complaint, a similar disadvantage is suffered by an employer
when a union is permitted to continue unprotected picketing perhaps for
the entire duration of the strike. Since the Sears decision does not guide
the state courts' choices of when the injunction should issue, it is within the
discretion of those courts to determine which of these drastically different
circumstances characterizes the outcome of a strike.
Because economic pickets engaged in strikes on private property open to
the public are sometimes employees of lessees rather than owners of such
property, owners of the property may seek state injunctions against pickets
who continue their protest upon instruction to leave. Although this type of
activity may not fall within the category of nonemployee conduct the
Sears majority found likely to be unprotected, it is conceivable that state
courts will prohibit it as such. Board decisions, however, do not support
the inference that such activity is unprotected. In Giant Food, the Board
found the significant question in such cases to be not whether the pickets
are employees of the picketed employer but whether they are employees of
an employer located at the situs of the picketing.'47 Similarly, in Scott
Hudgens, the Board considered the fact that the pickets were employees of
an employer located where the picketing took place in finding that the
employer had unlawfully interfered with the pickets' section 7 rights. 48 In
cases such as these, the Board has found that employees are governed by
more lenient standards than those applied to individuals who have no im-
mediate relationship to the target employer, such as nonemployee union
organizers and area standards pickets. Accordingly, the accommodation
principle should invariably apply to hold picketing by employees at these
locations protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, the Supreme Court has removed a judicial hiatus in employer
civil remedies. State courts are now supplied with a framework for deter-
mining when their jurisdiction must yield to that of the Board in applying
cotts. Employers may bring such pressure by replacing strikers, lockouts, and, under Sears,
state trespass injunctions. See id at 95-96.
147. Giant Food Mkts. Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 101 L.R.R.M. 1598, 1599, application
for review granted, No. 79-1248 (6th Cir. June 15, 1979).
148. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 416 (1977).
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their trespass laws to union conduct arguably protected by section 7. The
Sears Court has also related to state courts in dicta that it expects the
Board to grant nonemployees little deference in applying the Babcock
principle to forms of concerted conduct that may be challenged in state
trespass actions. In contrast, the Board has recognized that private prop-
erty is an interest of lessening importance for industries establishing busi-
nesses on private complexes open to the public. Accordingly, the Board
has demonstrated a willingness to accommodate the activity of nonem-
ployees engaged in area standards picketing and organizational activity, as
well as that of striking employees picketing on leased property.
The conflict of Court dicta and Board standards has serious implications
for the preservation of the Babcock accommodation principle as it is ex-
panded by the Board to meet the special problems facing unions in new
types of business environments. In Babcock, the Court has entrusted the
accommodation of nonemployee access rights to the Board. The Sears
Court, as it inaccurately characterizes the Board's standard for accommo-
dating unions, purports to represent the weight of Board precedent on
which state courts may depend in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction
over access disputes. The consequences of reliance by these courts on the
Sears dicta is substantial in light of the Court's failure to fix the point in
time at which state court jurisdiction is preempted. Without a resolution
of this issue, state courts have substantial discretion in determining
whether and when the trespass remedy should be administered. A
Supreme Court clarification of its position in Sears is necessary to forestall
the detrimental effects on union concerted conduct that inevitably will re-
sult from inconsistent state court and Board holdings in access cases.
Patrick G. Kavanagh
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